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JOE GRANO: THE "KID FROM SOUTH PHILLY""
WHO EDUCATED US ALL
YALE KAMISA t
No serious student of police interrogation and confessions can
write on the subject without building on Professor Joseph D.
Grano's work or explaining why he or she disagrees with him (and
doing so with considerable care). Nor is that all.
Although best known for his trenchant and provocative writing
on confessions, especially his 1993 book, which collects many of his
earlier articles in greatly revised form,1 Professor Grano is also the
author of a number of important articles on other aspects of
criminal procedure Indeed, he wrote several significant articles
before ever tackling any of the many difficult problems raised by
the law of confessions.
Grano's first article, written when he was an Instructor in Legal
Research and Writing at the University of Illinois College of Law,
addressed several difficult right to counsel issues: whether a
criminal defendant had a right to conduct his own defense at his
trial (or, to put it another way, whether a trial judge could "force"
a lawyer upon a defendant), whether a defense lawyer could waive
-See infira note 28.
tClarence Darrow Distinguished University Professor, University of
Michigan Law School; Visiting Professor, University of San Diego Law School.
A.B. 1950, New York University; LL.B. 1954, Columbia.
1. See JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW (1993).
Unlike other commentators who have simply collected and reprinted their
articles in a book without revising them, see, for example, YALE KAMISAR,
POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY
(1980), when Grano published his book on confessions he spent many months
expanding, updating, and reworking views he had expressed in earlier articles. See
the preface to his book.
2. For that matter, Grano has written outside the field of criminal
procedure. See Joseph D. Grano, Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in
a Democratic Society, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1981); see also Joseph D. Grano, Ely's
Theory ofjudicial Review: Preserving the Significance of the Political Process, 42
OHIO ST. L.J. 167 (1981).
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his client's objections to unconstitutional governmental conduct,
and various problems raised by the claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.3 These issues, as Grano observed, "were generally ignored"
until the right to appointed counsel had been established in Gideon
v. Wainwright.4
Although not quite as good as some of his later work, Grano's
"first article" showed many of the qualities that were to characterize
his scholarship for the next three decades: strong powers of
analysis; exhaustive reading of the relevant literature and
meticulously careful reading of the relevant cases; clear, crisp,
vigorous writing; impressive use of historical materials and the
available empirical data;5 a propensity to tackle hard questions; and
a willingness, in the end, to leave no doubt where he stood-but
only after taking pains to state the best arguments against his
ultimate position as well as he could.'
3. SeeJoseph D. Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral IssuesAffecting Due
Process, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1175 (1970). This article was based on Grano's Masters
of Law thesis, written under the direction of Professor Wayne LaFave. For
Grano's warm tribute to his former mentor, on the latter's retirement, see
Joseph D. Grano, WayneR. LaFave, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 181 (1993).
4. See Grano, TheRight to Counsel, supra note 3, at 1175. The reference is to
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5. In subsequent years, Grano made admirable use of comparative criminal
procedure materials. See Grano, supra note 1, at 6-10, 16-17, 49-50, 100-01, 128-
33.
6. In his Minnesota Law Review article, Grano maintained that a
constitutional right should be waivable only when a fair trial is possible without
it and that often this will not be the case when the right to the assistance of
counsel is waived. This led him to conclude that waiver of trial counsel should
not be permitted. See Grano, The Right to Counsel, supra note 3, at 1197-1208.
Five years later, a 6-3 majority of the Supreme Court disagreed. See Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Last year, however, in Martinez v. Court of
Appeal of California, 528 U.S. 152 (2000), the Court, per Stevens, J., concluded,
without a dissent, that "neither the holding nor the reasoning in Faretta requires
[a state] to recognize a constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal
from a criminal conviction." Id. at 692. No one, observed Justice Stevens, not
even the Faretta majority, "attempts to argue that as a rule pro se representation
is wise, desirable or efficient." Id. at 691. Stevens noted that recently a critic of
1232
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A year later, shortly after he had joined the University of
Detroit law faculty, Grano published his second article-an
extremely thoughtful piece on various search and seizure problems
One of the Supreme Court decisions Grano focused on was McCray
v. Illinois, which had rejected the argument (as the Supreme Court
described it) that "the Constitution somehow compels [a state] to
abolish the informer's privilege ... and to require disclosure of the
informer's identity... [whenever] it appears that the [officer] made
the arrest or search in reliance upon facts supplied by an informer
they had reason to trust."9 After a careful review of the history and
rationale of the informer's privilege, Grano sharply criticized
McCray. He argued persuasively that it was not only wrong as a
matter of policy, but "based primarily on a wrong reading of two
centuries of precedent. ""
Those who are only familiar with Grano's strong criticism of
some of the Warren Court's most famous criminal procedure
cases-and thus think of him only as a proponent of greater police-
prosecution powers-will be surprised to learn that in his 1971
search and seizure article Grano maintained that "police perjury is
a more significant threat than courts are willing to acknowledge,""
and that therefore "procedural rules are needed that discourage
rather than facilitate perjury." 2
Grano also told us: "Once an issue is brought before a court, no
room exists for callous indifference to proper results because the
Faretta had argued that "the right to proceedpro se at trial in certain cases is akin
to allowing the defendant to waive his right to a fair trial." Id. at 691 n. 9. As
indicated above, Professor Grano made essentially the same argument thirty
years ago.
7. SeeJoseph D. Grano,A DilemmaforDefense Counsel: Spinelli-HarrisSearch
Warrants and the Possibility ofPolice Pejury, 1971 U. ILL L.F. 405.
8. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
9. Id. at 312.
10. Grano, supra note 7, at 440.
11.Id. at 456.
12. Id- As Grano noted in his article, he had just completed a year's work in
the Philadelphia prosecutor's office, handling almost exclusively motions to
suppress evidence. See id. at 409.
2000] 1233
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defendant is obviously guilty. It would be better openly to permit
police perjury and illegal searches than to make a farce of judicial
proceedings." 3
Three years later, when still an Assistant Professor of Law at
the University of Detroit, Grano wrote a robust article on the
Court's pretrial identification cases. I have always considered it the
best article-the most thoughtful, most powerful, most insightful
and most comprehensive-ever written on the subject. 4
Although, as Professor Grano emphasized, mistaken
identification has probably been the single greatest cause of
conviction of the innocent," the Supreme Court did not come to
grips with this problem until the closing years of the Warren
tenure. Then the Court seemed to make up for lost time. In a 1967
trilogy of cases, United States v. Wade, Gilbert v. California, and
Stovall v. Denno,6 the Court leapfrogged case-by-case analysis of
various pretrial identification situations and applied the right to
counsel to identification in one dramatic move. Because absent a
defense lawyer's presence, the pretrial lineup "may not be capable
of reconstruction at trial,"' the Court deemed counsel's presence
essential to "avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation
at trial.""
Although nothing in the Warren Court's reasoning suggested
that a lineup held before a defendant is formally charged is less
riddled with dangers or less difficult for a suspect to reconstruct
without the presence of counsel than one occurring after this point,
13. Id. at 440.
14. See Joseph D. Grano, Kirby, Biggers and Ash: Do Any Constitutional
Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MICH. L.
REV. 717 (1974). Grano's article was also one of the largest ever written on the
subject. It was eighty-one pages long and contained 485 footnotes.
15. See id. at 723-24 and authorities discussed therein. See also Francis A.
Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal
Cases, 1975 U. Ill. L. F. 518, 54142 (1975).
16. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
17. Wade, 388 U.S. at 236.
18. Id.
1234
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in Kirby v. Illinois 9 the Burger Court announced that the lineup
decisions only applied to post-indictment identification. A year
after Kirby, the Court struck the Wade-Gilbert rule another heavy
blow. Although the availability of the photographs at trial provides
no protection against the suggestive manner in which they may
have been originally shown to the witness or the comments that
may have accompanied the display, the Court held in United States
v. Ashi0 that the Wade-Gilbert right to counsel did not apply to a
pretrial photo-identification procedure-even though it took place
after the suspect had been indicted and even though the suspect
could have appeared in a lineup.
Taken together, Kirby and Ash badly crippled the original
lineup decisions. Grano recognized that "[tihe change in judicial
temperament reflected in [Kirby andAsh] may have been inevitable,
given the political climate and the sudden vacancies that developed
on the Supreme Court."21 Nevertheless, he found it
somewhat surprising that the [Burger] Court chose the
identification cases to mark the first major retreat in the
criminal procedure area. Unlike the confession,
wiretapping, and search and seizure cases, which furthered
sodietal values not usually related to guilt or innocence, the
early identification cases explicitly sought to protect the
innocent from wrongful conviction. Certainly it cannot be
argued that society's newly declared war against crime will
benefit by increasing the risk that innocent persons will be
convicted.'
Despite Kirby and Ash, abuses in photographic displays and in
preindictment lineups are not beyond the reach of the
Constitution-in theory. Under what is sometimes called the
19. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
20. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
21. Grano, supra note 14, at 722.
22. Id.
20001 1235
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Stovall-Simmons' totality of circumstances test, one may still
convince a court that the circumstances surrounding her
identification present so substantial a likelihood of "irreparable
misidentification" as to violate due process.24 However, as Grano's
criticism of this test makes clear, in practice-and once again his
comments are likely to surprise those who view Grano only as a
police-prosecution-oriented commentator-the "totality of
circumstances" test offers the defendant precious little help:
The Stovall-Simons totality-of-circumstances test requires
a case-by-case evaluation of identification procedures. This
approach has several shortcomings. First, it leaves the police
with too much discretion. The lack of guiding rules or
standards not only fails adequately to protect the innocent
from improper suggestion, but also works, ultimately, to
impede confident and effective law enforcement ....
Second, the Stovall-Simmons test manifests an unrealistic
and naive faith in the willingness of trial and appellate
courts to rectify errors in identification procedures. This
criticism implies no disrespect for the judiciary; it merely
suggests that our rules should comport with psychological
realities. Those closely associated with prosecutors and
appellate courts must be aware of the potent, almost
indomitable psychological pressure to find means for
preserving convictions, particularly in ugly cases. Because
that pressure is so compelling, the Supreme Court should
have anticipated that courts generally would use every
conceivable method to avoid finding due process violations
except in the most outrageous situations.... .'
Quite obviously, the chaotic due process decisions
neither sufficiently protect against mistaken identifications
23. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377 (1968).
24. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-201 (1972). See also Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110-14, 117 (1977).
25. Grano, supra note 14, at 780.
1236
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nor adequately develop guidelines for law enforcement. An
approach yielding concrete standards would be preferable
from everyone's perspective.26
In 1979, Professor Grano, now a full professor of law at Wayne
State University, wrote two leading articles on police interrogation
and confessions.' Each one examined and rethought basic premises
underlying the law of confessions. With the publication of these
articles, the "kid from South Philly,"28 only eleven years out of law
school, became a major figure in constitutional-criminal procedure.
In his American Criminal Law Review article, Grano argued
that the Supreme Court should overturn a state court's ruling
banning the use of a confession that the defendant made in a patrol
wagon.2 (The Court agreed.)3" Grano also argued, quite
persuasively, I think (and once again, the Court has agreed),31 that,
absent special circumstances in other settings, Miranda should be
limited to the police station:
Obviously some potential for compulsion exists in every
police-citizen encounter. Unless Miranda is to apply to all
such encounters, it should be applicable only when the
potential for compulsion reaches some legally sufficient
threshold level.. 32
26. Id. at 781.
27. See Joseph D. Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need to Reconsider the
Constitutional Premises Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1 (1979); Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions,
65 VA. L. REV. 859 (1979).
28.JosephD. Grano, WayneR. LaFave, 1993 U.ILL L. REV. 181, 185 (1993).
In his tribute to former mentor Wayne LaFave, Grano reminisced about his
youth, recalling that he had grown up in "an ethnic, working class neighborhood
of South Philadelphia," and described himself as the "kid from South Philly." Id
29. See State v. Innis, 391 A.2d 1158 (RI. 1978).
30. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
31. See Yale Kamisar, Remembering the "Old World" of Criminal Procedure'
A Reply to Professor Grano, 23 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 537, 586-87 (1990) and
authorities cited therein.
32. Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis, supra note 27, at 44.
20001 1237
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Custodial stationhouse questioning is the context in
which Miranda's parade of horribles is most likely to be
found. Indeed, as the Miranda Court observed, police
manuals suggest the interrogation room as the best place to
deprive the suspect of every psychological advantage.... ."
Of course, prophylactic rules are designed to make
difficult case-by-case evaluations unnecessary. To require
courts to distinguish, in terms of potential compulsion, one
question, or a few questions, from a more intimidating
process of interrogation, would defeat the whole purpose of
Miranda. It is one thing, however, to conclude that Miranda,
to be effective, must apply to all custodial stationhouse
questioning, no matter how brief or protracted, how benign
or menacing, it is quite another to conclude that all
questioning, in any custodial context dominated by the
police, must be subject to Miranda. The stationhouse is
unique not only in its isolation of the defendant but also in
the interrogation procedures it permits. In other custodial
contexts, where the potential for abusive and compelling
interrogation is not as great, the nature of the police
conduct at issue becomes more important. In these contexts,
the difference between non-threatening 'questioning' and
potentially compelling 'interrogation' cannot be easily
dismissed, indeed, refusal to consider this distinction is
really to assert that custody alone determines the need for
Miranda's prophylaxis.34
Grano believed the frequently voiced claim that our system of
criminal justice is accusatorial contributes to sloppy thinking. As he
put it years later, he shared the view of criminal procedure
comparativist Myron Damaska that this claim "is not so much
analytically precise as it is hortatory and rhetorical, aimed at
mobilizing consent and at winning points in legal argumentation. "
33.Id.
34. Id. at 46-47.
35. Grano, supra note 1, at 47. Grano also agreed with Justice Walter
1238
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Although he recognized that the fifth and sixth amendments
"assume, and thus mandate, an accusatorial mode of judicial
criminal proceedings,"36 he was quick to point out that our system
also has "inquisitorial attributes," such as police interrogation and
the investigative grand jury.37
As for those (like me) who complained about the wide disparity
between the inquisitorial practices in the "gatehouse" (the police
station) and the accusatorial protections in the "mansion" (the
courtroom),3 Grano made a plausible argument that the dichotomy
"is a product not of schizophrenia but of historical compromise: ""
Building from scratch, we could construct a system that
more consistently and more rationally accommodates these
competing tensions. We might, for example,.., remove the
interrogation process from police control, where it is largely
invisible and often abused, and place it in the sunlight of
open court. Such reforms, however, are precluded by the
evolutionary development of constitutional doctrine, now
too ingrained to be altered. Even judicial examination of the
accused at the preliminary examination, which persisted in
New York into the mid-nineteenth century, is now
everywhere recognized as unacceptable. The tightening of
constitutional controls on the judicial process, however,
occurred simultaneously with the development of
extrajudicialprocedures to performthe needed investigatory
* function. Indeed, the possibility cannot be dismissed that
the judicial process became more rigid only because the
Schaefer that talk about our accusatorial system seems "more suitable for Law
Day speeches than for analytical judicial opinion." See id.
36. Grano, supra note 27, at 22.
37. See id. at 23. See also Grano's criticism of liberal rhetoric in the text at
infra notes 60-61.
38. See YALE KAMISAR, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of
American Criminal Procedure, in PoucE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS
27-40 (1980).
39. Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis, supra note 27, at 27.
20001 1239
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system became more flexible in its prejudicial stages.'4
Professor Grano often chafed at the restraints imposed on the
police by the Warren Court. Nevertheless, as his discussion of the
Massiah doctrine41 demonstrates, he was independent-minded; he
was willing to go wherever his analysis of a rule took him, whether
or not it diminished police power. Dissenting in Brewer v.
Williams,42 the "Christian Burial Speech" case, Justice White
rejected the notion that the right involved in Massiah "is a right not
to be asked any question in counsel's absence rather than a right not
to answer any questions in counsel's absence."43 Grano retorted that
"Justice White could not be more wrong in his criticism:""
The whole point of Massiab is the prevention of the state
from taking advantage of an uncounseled defendant once
sixth amendment rights attach. The Christian burial speech
was an attempt to take advantage of Williams .... The
attempt itself violates the constitutional mandate that the
system proceed, after some point, only in an accusatorial
manner.
45
Indeed, although Justice Stewart, writing for a 5-4 majority in
Brewery. Williams, had revivifiedMassiah,4' Grano pointed out that
40. Id. at 27-28.
41. SeeMassiah v. UnitedStates, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Massiah holds that once
adversary proceedings have commenced against an individual (for example, he
has been indicted or arraigned), government efforts to "deliberately elicit"
incriminating statements from him violate the individual's right to counsel and
bar the use of any resulting statement regardless of whether it was voluntarily
made. See Massiab, 377 U.S. at 205-07; see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387
(1977).
42. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
43. Id. at 435-46. Justice White also rejected the view that Massiah involved
a "right not to be asked questions" that "must be waivedbefore the questions are
asked." Id.
44. Grano, Rhode lsland v. Innis, supra note 27, at 35.
45. Id.
46. Justice Stewart also wrote the opinion of the Court in Massiak.
1240
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by indicating Williams could have waived his sixth amendment
rights without notice to his lawyer, even Stewart had probably read
the Massiab doctrine too narrowly:
[A] strong argument can be made that [the majority
opinion in] Williams did not go far enough. Since the point
of Massiah is either to prohibit altogether extrajudicial
proceedings against the accused once sixth amendment
rights attach, or to inject the rights of the adversarial system
into such extrajudicial proceedings, a simple waiver of rights
should not be acceptable. Rather, the Court should rule..
. that no effort to elicit information from the defendant
should occur unless the police seek to notify counsel. In
cases where no lawyer exists to be notified, a waiver should
be required to meet the standards that govern waiver of the
right to counsel at trial. Any other standard undermines
Massiah's rationale.'
Grano also showed his independence of mind by rejecting the
Office of Legal Policy's criticism of two great right to counsel cases,
Johnson v. Zerbst48 and Gideon v. Wainwright.49 When, in the late
1980s, the Office of Legal Policy of the U.S. Department of Justice
issued the Truth in CriminalJustice Series--a series of reports that
47. Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis, supra note 27, at 35.
48.304 U.S. 458 (1938) (continuing the sixth amendment to entitle indigent
persons accused of serious federal offenses to appointed counsel).
49. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the fourteenth amendment requires
states to offer appointed counsel to indigent persons accused of crimes carrying
the possibility of significant prison sentences).
50. The reports were prepared under the supervision of Assistant Attorney
General (now Michigan Supreme Court Justice) Stephen J. Markman, then in
charge of the Office of Legal Policy, and were submitted to Attorney General
Edwin Meese III, and then circulated within the Justice Department. See Stephen
J. Markman, Foreword: The Truth in Criminal Justice' Series, 22 U. MICH. J. L.
REF. 425, 430 & n. 10 (1989). The reports "represent advice and information
presented to the Attorney General and should not be taken as reflecting the
official position of the Department of Justice, of any Attorney General, or of
any other departmental component or entity." Id. at 430.
20001 1241
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reexamined and criticized the law of pretrial interrogation, the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule, and other features of criminal
procedure saidto impede the search for truth-Grano heaped much
praise on the Series."1 But, he could not go along with one of the
report's criticism of Johnson and Gideon as unwarranted departures
from the "original understanding." He explained why, even as he
reaffirmed his belief in "original meaning jurisprudence:"
It is appropriate in constitutional interpretation to ask
what ends or purposes the framers and ratifiers were trying
to achieve. The purpose underlying the sixth amendment,
in my view, was to assure the accused, through legal
assistance, a meaningful opportunity to confront his
accusers and to present a defense, a purpose that cannot be
achieved for indigent defendants unless the state provides
the opportunity to obtain legal assistance.
To argue that the framers did not understand the
amendment as providing a right to appointed counsel is to
miss the point, at least partially. Too often the assumption
is made that original meaning jurisprudence depends
exclusively upon either an examination of the subjective
intentions of the framers or an inquiry into the framers
would have resolved the particular dispute at issue. In this
regard, the teaching of Judge Bork on the judge's role in
constitutional interpretation is instructive:
[It is the task of the judge in this generation to
discern how the framers' values, defined in the
context of the world they knew, apply to the world
we know.... The fourth amendment was framed
by men who did not foresee electronic surveillance.
But that does not make it wrong for judges to apply
the central value of that amendment to electronic
51. See Joseph D. Grano, Introduction-the Changed and Changing World of
Constitutional Criminal Procedure: The Contribution oftheDepartment ofJustice's
Office ofLegal Policy, 22 U. MIcH. J. L. REF. 395, 404-05, 409-10, 412-13,417-19,
420-24.
1242
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invasions of personal privacy .... The evolution of
doctrine to accomplish that end [i.e., making the
framers' values effective] contravenes no postulate of
judicial restraint.
Judge Bork's judicial philosophy, which permits the
evolution of doctrine to effectuate the framers' values and
purposes, should not be confused with the philosophy,
reflected in much of what passes as constitutional law today,
that permits courts to add to the Constitution values and
principles never ratified by the people. 2
One of my favorite Grano pieces (even though he takes a few
swings at me and others "who worship at Miranda's shrine") 3 is his
essay review of the third edition of the Inbau-Reid-Buckley police
interrogation manual5 4 Grano underscores the basic tension that
exists between the tactics recommended by the police manual he is
reviewing and the underlying principles of cases like Escobedo and
Miranda. At one point he observes:
If orchestrated properly, the warnings and waiver will
occur not simply in the inherently compelling atmosphere
of the stationhouse but in a room purposefully designed to
increase the suspect's anxiety. While those who invoke their
52. Id. at 396-97 n. 5 (quoting from Judge Bork's concurring opinion in
Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (newspaper
column protected by first amendment against libel suit).
53. Joseph D. Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional
Interrogator and Modern Confessions Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 662, 664 & n. 11
(1986).
54. See Grano, supra note 53, reviewing FRED E. INBAU, ET. AL., CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (3d ed. 1986). The first edition of this
manual was quoted at considerable length in Chief Justice Warren's opinion of
the Court in Miranda, but never with approval. See 384 U.S. at 449-50, 452,454-
55. For an essay review of the first edition, one that takes a very different view
of the interrogation manual than does Grano, see Yale Kamisar, What is an
"Involuntary" Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728 (1963) (book review).
2000] 1243
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Miranda rights will be spared the inherent pressures of
questioning, their luckless counterparts who decide to
match wits with the police will be subject to pressures that
make the inherent compulsion of a simple question, such as
'Where were you last night?,' pale by comparison. If we
take seriously Miranda's reasoning, we should not feel
comfortable with the authors' 'professional interrogator.'
Conversely, if we approve the authors' goal of training
professionals for successful interrogation, we should be
candid in recognizing our disapproval of Miranda's
premises. Without hypocrisy, we cannot have it both
ways.
55
As usual, Grano leaves no doubt where he stands: "[W]e have
no reason to read the fifth amendment as prohibiting police
interrogation, as protecting against the inherent pressure of
custodial interrogation, or as prohibiting the tactics the authors
suggest to increase the suspect's anxiety in the police station."',
Grano recognizes, of course, that the police interrogation manual's
tactics "are inconsistent with Miranda's premises, but it is those
premises, not [the manual's] tactics, that lack persuasive
justification." 7
Do we believe in the philosophy underlying Escobedo and
Miranda? Grano doubts that many of us really do." If we did, "we
would have to regard [the interrogation manual he is reviewing] as
a blueprint for police illegality." 9 But, "[i]t is no such thing. The
book is a manual for successful interrogation that a free, civilized,
and just society can and should endorse without apology."'
Grano's essay review of the Inbau-Reid-Buckley interrogation
manual is something every student of confessions should read,
55. Grano, supra note 53, at 675.
56. Id. at 689.
57. Id. at 689.
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especially those who believe that the tactics typically utilized by
police interrogators are "morally offensive" or fail to accord with
"autonomy and dignity." Grano may not change their minds, but
at the very least he should make them rethink how they arrived at
their conclusions.
[Despite language in Miranda to the contrary] our
morality does not consider the tactics of successful
interrogation an affront to human dignity. Miranda also
indicated that the fifth amendment seeks to maintain a "fair
state-individual balance" and to require the government "to
shoulder the entire load." The concept of fairness, however,
like the concept of dignity, requires analysis.... [O]ur
morality does not consider it "unfair" for the state to
succeed in obtaining a confession or a conviction. Likewise,
only a sporting theory of justice could favor equality
between the suspect and the state for its own sake. It also is
fiction to say that our legal system requires the government
to shoulder the entire load. We require the defendant to
stand in lineups for identification, to provide fingerprints,
blood, and handwriting samples, to submit to psychiatric
examinations, to provide pretrial discovery of certain
defenses and witnesses, and sometimes even to respond to
subpoenas for documents. We also permit grand juries to
subpoena targets of their investigations.61
His essay review of the interrogation manual is probably the
best example of his tough-mindedness and his ability to dissect
stirring rhetoric. Consider the following:
[D]espite the frequent incantations of the phrase,...
there is no right of silence. The fifth amendment right is a
right not to be compelled to become a witness against
oneself. The right of silence exists only in the limited sense
61. Id. at 686-87.
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that the state cannot compel a person to answer.
This is not just a semantic quibble. If a right of silence as
such existed, we could not justify protecting that right only
for those in custody, for the fifth amendment applies to the
noncustodial as well as the custodial suspect... If the fifth
amendment guaranteed a right of silence, even wiretapping
and the use of informants could raise troubling issues.
Certainly the use of a suspect's silence as evidence would
not be impermissible only when the police provided
antecedent Miranda warnings.62
Probably Grano's most ambitious and most interesting
article-certainly his best-known-is his 1985 article questioning the
constitutional legitimacy of "prophylactic rules" in criminal
procedure.63 As Grano explains it, a prophylactic rule is one that
"functions as a preventive safeguard to ensure that constitutional
violations will not occur. What distinguishes a prophylactic rule
[such as Miranda] from a true constitutional rule is the possibility
of violating the former without actually violating the
Constitution."'
Did the Miranda Court promulgate prophylactic rules? Grano
concedes that "the Miranda opinion itself was somewhat
ambiguous," 5 but "Miranda's progeny remove any doubts
concerning its prophylactic nature."" After a long journey,' and
62. Id. at 688-89.
63. See Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure" A
Question ofArticle NlLegitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 100 (1985).
64. Id. at 105.
65. Id. at 106.
66. Id. at 109-10. At this point, Grano notes, inter alia, that although
"involuntary statements, in the due process sense, and 'compelled' statements,
in the fifth amendment sense, cannot be used for any purpose, not even to
impeach the defendant's credibility at trial," the Court has permitted statements
obtained "in violation of Miranda... to be used for impeachment purposes." Id.
at 110. Moreover, the "fruit of the poisonous tree analysis differs depending upon
whether the police violate the Fifth Amendment or only Miranda." Id. As
Professor Grano notes, in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,306 (1985), "the Court
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after considering and rejecting many possible justifications, Grano
concludes that the Miranda rules constitute one of "a small core of
prophylactic rules [that] can be neither justified as an exercise of
judicial rulemaking at the nonconstitutional level nor reinterpreted
to express actual constitutional requirements," and thus "must be
outside the scope of the federal courts' Article Il lawmaking
authority."6
8
Grano's "prophylactic rules" article shows a thorough
understanding of all the relevant cases and an impressive mastery of
all the relevant literature (indeed, so far as I can tell, knowledge of
every article remotely bearing on his subject). The "prophylactic
rules" article demonstrates that Grano is not only a leading criminal
procedure commentator, but a fine constitutional scholar as well.
Among other things, he discusses, at considerable length and with
considerable skill, the teachings of Erie v. Tompkins,'9
"constitutional common law,"70 the Court's power to invalidate
state legislation as inconsistent with the negative implications of the
commerce clause, 71 the implied power of federal courts,' and the
federal question implications of specific constitutional provisions."
Along the way, Professor Grano takes on (and certainly holds
his own against) two of the nation's most renowned constitutional
law experts, Henry P. Monaghan and William W. Van Alstyne.
What I find admirable about Grano is that before publishing his
article exploring and rejecting Professor Monaghan's thesis that
prophylactic rules can be justified as constitutional common law,74
stated that the Miranda rule 'sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment
itself' and 'may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment
violation." Id. at 110-11.
67. Professor Grano's "prophylactic rules" article is sixty-fivepages long and
contains more than 400 footnotes, many of them quite long.
68. Grano, supra note 63, at 163-64.
69. See id. at 125-29 (discussing ErieR. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
70. Id. at 129-36.
71. See id. at 130-33.
72. See id. at 137-47.
73. See id. at 147-56.
74. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword
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and considering but differing with some of Professor Van Alstyne's
views on the implied power of the federal judiciary,75 he sought,
and received, comments from both professors on an early draft of
his article.76 This is the way scholars ought to proceed.
I think his "prophylactic rules" article best illustrates Grano's
strong powers of analysis. Although others have lumped them
together, Grano rightly draws a distinction between prophylactic
rules and "deterrent remedies," such as the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule.' The latter remedies apply "only after an actual
constitutional violation has occurred.""8 I think he also correctly
distinguishes between prophylactic rules, which the Court believes
(at least it did at the time Grano's article was written) may be
imposed on the state courts and the so-called supervisory power of
federal courts,79 and prophylactic rules and rules or procedures
mandated by a constitutional provision, such as the Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel, which is violated if
an indigent defendant is denied counsel at trial even if the trial is
otherwise fair.' "An instrumental function does not identify a rule
as prophylactic," points out Grano, "because constitutional
provisions themselves may have an instrumental purpose."8"
For many years I thought, as did others, that when the Court
ruled in the 1967 case of United States v. Wad?' that the right to
counsel applied to pretrial lineups, 3 it promulgated a prophylactic
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).
75. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining
Incidental Powers of the Praident and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the
Horizontal Effect ofthe Sweeping Clause, 40 LAW&CONTEMP.PRoBS. 102 (1976).
76. In the opening footnote to his article, Grano thanks Professors
Monaghan and Van Alstyne for their "helpful comments." Grano supra note 63,
at 100.
77. See Grano, supra note 63, at 103-04.
78. Id. at 104.
79. See id. at 104-05.
80. See id. at 115-16.
81. Id. at 115.
82. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
83. The Court subsequently limited Wade's holding to lineups held after the
defendant had been indicted, although nothing in Wade's reasoning suggested
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rule. For one thing, the Wade Court used language that sounded like
it was applying a prophylactic rule. It told us, for example, that
"[s]ince it appears that there is grave potential... for prejudice..
. in the pretrial lineup which [absent defense counsel's presence]
may not be capable of reconstruction at trial," counsel's presence is
essential to "avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation
at trial."' Moreover, the Court was careful to point out that
"[l]egislative or other regulations ... which eliminate the risks of
abuse and unintentional suggestion at lineup proceedings and the
impediments to meaningful confrontation at trial may also remove
the basis for regarding the [pretrial lineup] stage as 'critical.'" 5
Nevertheless, Grano's 1985 article convinced me that Wade's
right to counsel requirement is not a prophylactic rule after all:
Prior to Wade, the Court had interpreted the sixth
amendment right to counsel provision as applying not only
at trial but also at all "critical stages" of the prosecution.
Pointing to the uncertainties of eyewitness identification...
[the Wade Court] held that a post-indictment lineup is a
critical stage at which the defendant is entitled to be
represented by counsel. Such a holding... seems to be of
the pure Marbury variety....
Neither [the Court's concern about the defendant's
interest in a fair trial] nor the suggestion that legislative
protections might obviate the need for counsel... proves
that the Court promulgated a prophylactic rule. The sixth
amendment critical stage doctrine depends upon fair trial
considerations, and the fairness concern itself follows from
the sixth amendment's instrumental purpose of
guaranteeing a fair trial. . . . The right to counsel
requirement in Wade is rooted squarely in the sixth
amendment's right to counsel provision and the Court's
reliance on this provision is no less apparent because of its
such a narrow reading. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
84. Wade, 388 U.S. at 236.
85. Id. at 239.
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expressed concern for the fairness of the defendant's trial.
Similarly, for purposes of categorizing Wade, the
Court's suggestion that legislative safeguards might obviate
the need for counsel is not determinative. Under Wade,
denial of counsel at lineups as they are presently conducted
actually violates the sixth amendment. Lineups conducted
under different conditions, like procedures to analyze
fingerprints or blood samples, may not jeopardize a fair trial
and accordingly may not be critical stages for right to
counsel purposes. Any constitutional rule that is factually
dependent is subject to change as the facts change. Thus,
although the Court in Wade, like in Miranda, made an
overture to the legislature, the Court in Wade, unlike in
Miranda, decreed what the Constitution actually requires,
at least in present circumstances. Under conditions as they
now exist, a violation of the right to counsel at lineups is a
violation of the Constitution itself.86
What about the Massiah rule?" As Grano observed, this rule
(which bars the use of any resulting statement, regardless of
whether it was voluntarily made, when the government
deliberately elicits incriminating statements from a defendant
against whom adversary proceedings have commenced), 8 "seems to
be a first cousin of the Miranda rule."' Not surprisingly, therefore,
then-Justice Relnquist once maintained that Massiah "rests on a
prophylactic application of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
that.., entirely ignores the doctrinal foundation of that right."9"
Grano disagrees. He argues, quite convincingly, that as the Court
originally perceived the rule and as it has since described it, a
violation of the rule is nothing less than a violation of one's Sixth
86. Grano, supra note 63, at 119-21.
87. See supra note 41.
88. See id
89. Grano, supra note 63, at 122.
90. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 289 (1980) (Relmquist, J.,
dissenting).
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Amendment right to counsel.9' The Court may have interpreted
the Sixth Amendment incorrectly when it promulgated the Massiab
rule, concedes Grano,92 but such a charge "is significantly different
from a charge that the Court has acted illegitimately."93
The publication of his 1985 "prophylactic rules" article left no
doubt that Grano had become the nation's leading critic of
Miranda. This position was reinforced by the publication of three
other articles in the next three years-the aforementioned 1986
essay review of the new edition of the Inbau-Reid-Buckley
interrogation manual;94 a 1987 article attacking the basic premises
of Miranda and calling for a return to a modified voluntariness
test;95 and a 1988 forceful reply to articles by Stephen J. Schulhofer
and David Strauss, two University of Chicago Law School
professors who attempted to refute the charge that Miranda
represents an illegitimate exercise of judicial power.
Professor Grano subsequently summarized these articles as
follows:
I have maintained that Miranda not only is wrong but
also sufficiently pernicious, in terms of its underlying
rationale if not its practical consequences, to warrant
overruling despite the strong commitment we should have
to stare decisis. Most fundamentally, I have argued that
91. See Grano, supra note 63, at 122-23.
92. See id at 123 n.133.
93. Id
94. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
95. See Joseph D. Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and The Legal Mind-
Formalism's Triumph Over Substance and Reason, 24 Am. Grim. L. Rev. 243
(1987).
96. See Joseph D. Grano, Miranda's Constitutional Difilculties: A Reply to
Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174 (1988) (responding to Stephen J.
Schulhofer, ReconsideringMiranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435 (1987) and David A.
Strauss, The Ubiquity of Propb.ylacti Rules, 55 U. CI-H. L. REV. 190 (1988)).
Although Grano's article is listed as only a reply to Schulhofer, he also
responded to Strauss's more recent article in a three-page "postscript." See 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. at 187-89.
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Miranda represents an exercise of judicial authority not
conveyed by Article IT, given the Court's current view that
Miranda violations often are not constitutional violations.
In addition, I have argued that while this legitimacy
objection can be overcome by concluding that all Miranda
violations indeed are constitutional violations, no plausible
interpretation of the word "compelled" in the Fifth
Amendment can support such a conclusion. From the
perspective of mere policy, I have argued that Miranda's
negative view of police interrogation and confessions is
misguided and even dangerous. I have also tried to
demonstrate that Miranda has led to a jurisprudence that
emphasizes formalism over substance."
"Consistency" in the confessions area can be achieved,
maintained Grano, "only by drastically extending Miranda or by
overruling it." 8 "Compromise and inconsistency," he added,
"should not be equated. In the name of compromise, what we really
have is a Court that pays homage to cases that challenge the
legitimacy of police interrogation, but that protects police
interrogation from those very same cases.""
Grano's 1988 reply to Schulhofer's and Strauss' defense of
Miranda's prophylactic rules is a good illustration of how patiently
and fairly Grano treats his opponents. He presented the views of
Schulhofer and Strauss as carefully and effectively as he could
before trying to pick apart their arguments-which he proceeded to
do with his customary vim and vigor. I think Grano welcomes, and
enjoys, doing battle with his "liberal" counterparts. I know he is
very good at it.
I happen to share the Schulhofer-Strauss view that sometimes
(such as the time the Miranda Court took a long, hard look at the
voluntariness test and all its inadequacies) prophylactic rules are
97. Joseph D. Grano, Police Interrogation and the Constitution: Doctrinal
Tension and an Uncertain Future, 25 CRIM. L. BU.L 5, 9 (1989).
98. Id. at 23.
99. Idt
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both necessary and proper.1" Nevertheless, I have to say that when
Professor Grano grappled with Professors Schulhofer and Strauss
he certainly held his own, once again, against two extraordinarily
formidable opponents.
Grano's unhappiness with Miranda had been experienced earlier
by most members of Congress. Two years after Miranda, (and the
very year Grano graduated from law school), Congress enacted the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,101 a
provision of which (usually known as §3501, because of its
designation under Title 18 of the United Code) purported to
substitute the old "due process"-"totality of
circumstances"-"voluntariness" test for Miranda in the federal
courts. The provision remained more or less dormant for three
decades before the Fourth Circuit upheld the provision, in
Dickerson v. United States,'02 only to be reversed by the Supreme
Court.103
Eleven years before the Fourth Circuit held, "against the
express wishes of the Department of Justice,""" that §3501 was a
valid exercise of Congress' power to overrule Miranda, Grano
urged the Department of Justice to invoke and to defend §3501.05
100. SeeYale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress 'Overrule"Miranda?, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 883, 940-50 (2000); Yale Kamisar, Confessions, Search and Seizure and the
Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 465, 469-76 (1999).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000).
102. 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999).
103. See 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
104. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 695 (Michael, Cj., dissenting).
105. Grano did so by voicing strong support for a report of the U.S.
Department of Justice's Office of Legal Policy which challenged the legitimacy
of the Miranda rules and invited the Solicitor General's office to make use of
53501. See Joseph D. Grano, Introduction-The Changed and Changing World of
Constitutional Criminal Procedures: The Contribution oftheDepartment of.ustice's
Office of Legal Policy, 22 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 395, 404-05 (1989). The report,
OFFICE OF LEGAL PoIcy, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUsTIcE, 'TRUTH IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE' SERIES REPORT NO. 1, The Law ofPre.trial Interrogation, is
reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 437 (1989). The report was prepared under
the supervision of Stephen J. Markman, then Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Office of Legal Policy, now a Justice of the Michigan Supreme
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He found the argument that Congress could and did reject the
Miranda rules "plausible both because prophylactic rules have all
the characteristics of rules based on the Court's so-called
'supervisory power,' and because Congress unquestionably has
authority to reject rules based on the supervisory power." "
Unfortunately-as fate would have it-when the assault on
Miranda finally came in the late 1990s, a serious illness prevented
Grano from playing an active role. The torch passed to Professor
Paul Cassell, who won a stunning victory in the Fourth Circuit and
then defended §3501 (this time unsuccessfully) in the Supreme
Court.
106. Grano, supra note 105, at 405. Some years later, Grano had second
thoughts about the S 3501 argument:
While its logic is essentially sound, the [S 3501] argument's
ramifications give cause for concern. If Congress may reject Miranda
merely by prescribing what is tantamount to a rule of evidence for
federal courts, the question of a state's authority to do the same thing
cannot be avoided. No less than Congress in the federal system, state
legislatures and state courts have ultimate authority for prescribing the
rules of evidence in the various states, provided, of course, that they
stay within constitutional bounds. Miranda is an odd duck as a Supreme
Court decision, however, if every jurisdiction that it affects may reject
it simply by enacting a rule of evidence. The only way to avoid this
unsatisfactory result under the argument being considered is to
conclude that state institutions somehow lack the rule-making authority
that Congress has, but such a conclusion seems arbitrary and equally
unsatisfactory. Under either alternative, therefore, the argument that
Congress can direct the federal courts to disregard Miranda leads to
unattractive results when Miranda's status in the states is considered.
This is not to suggest that the statutory argument is flawed, for the
proposition that Congress can reject a judicially created rule of evidence
for the federal courts is not controversial. The problem is that the
Court in Miranda was speaking primarily to the states, only one of the
four cases that constitute Miranda having resulted from a federal
conviction. Because the reasoning of the statutory argument seems
correct, however, at least given the Court's current understanding of
Miranda, the statutory argument really raises once again the question of
the Court's authority to impose Miranda on the states in the first place.
See Grano, supra note 1, at 203-204.
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Court. 107
Professor Cassell readily acknowledges his debt to Professor
Grano. On the eve of the Supreme Court oral arguments in
Dickerson, Cassell wrote a long article spelling out why he thought
the Court should uphold §3501. l"' He dedicated the article to Joe
Grano, "whose brilliant book... makes the compelling doctrinal
case against Miranda.""°9
(I would put it somewhat differently. I agree that Grano wrote
a brilliant book, based to a considerable extent on a series of
brilliant articles, but I would say his book makes a plausible
doctrinal case against Miranda and a better case than anyone else
had made up to that time. A better case than I thought anyone
could make. (You can't do much better than that.))
[]
Grano must have been deeply disappointed by the Dickerson
Court's "reaffirmation" of Miranda. For no one had been a more
persistent critic of that case. Moreover, Grano must have been
jolted by the fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion of
the Court. (I know I was).
As Grano observed, by enacting §3501, "Congress succeeded in
expressing its hostility to what the Supreme Court had done, but
everyone really understood that a constitutional amendment, not
a mere statute, is required to overturn a decision based on the
107. Because neither the defendant in theDickerson case nor the Department
of Justice would defend the constitutionality of §3501 in the Supreme Court, the
Court "invited Professor Paul Cassell to assist our deliberations by arguing in
support of the judgment below." Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335 n. 7.
108. See Paul G. Cassell, The Statute that TmeForgot: 18 U.S. C §3501 and the
Overhauling ofMiranda, 85 IOWA L. REv. 175 (1999).
109. Id at 175. A short time thereafter, Professor Michael O'Neill published
an even longer article in defense of §3501, UndoingMiranda, 2000 BYU L. REV.
185 (2000). He dedicated his 108-page article to several people, "most of all, to
Joseph Grano, without whose seminal scholarship this piece would not have
been possible." Id at 185.
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Constitution."11 But then Justice Rehnquist's description of
Miranda as prophylactic in his opinion for the Court in Michigan
v. Tucker' "sparked renewed interest in the statute.""'
In Tucker, in the course of holding admissible the testimony of
a witness whose identity had been discovered by questioning the
defendant in violation of Miranda, the Court, per Rehnquist, J.,
maintained that the Miranda Court itself had recognized that the
now-familiar warnings "were not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the right
against compulsory self-incrimination was protected.""'
Furthermore, Rehnquist told us, the Miranda Court pointed out
that the suggested safeguards-what the Tucker opinion called "the
procedural rules" or the "prophylactic standards... laid down by
the Court in Miranda" 4-"were not intended to 'create a
constitutional straightjacket,' but rather to provide practical
reinforcement for the right against compulsory self-
incrimination.
" l15
Dissenting, Justice Douglas protested (and rightly so) that
Justice Rehnquist had taken language from Miranda out of
context.'16 Douglas conceded that Miranda does say that the
warnings need not be given, but only ifequally effective alternative
safeguards are in place" 7 and "[t]here is no contention here that
other means were adopted.""'
Justice Douglas, then in his thirty-fifth year on the Court,
reminded his younger colleague: "The Court is not free to prescribe
110. Grano, supra note 1, at 202. The Senate debate and subcommittee
hearings on what became of 53501 is replete with manifestations of hostility (and
contempt and ridicule) toward the Supreme Court. See Kamisar, Can (Did)
Congress "Overrule"Mirand?, supra note 100, at 894-909.
111. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
112. Grano, supra note 110, at 203.
113. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444.
114. le at 444-46.
115. Id at 444.
116. See id.'at 462-63.
117. See id at 463.
118. Id
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preferred modes of interrogation absent a constitutional basis. We
held the "requirement of warnings and waiver of rights [to be]
fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege," and
without so holding we would have been powerless to reverse
Miranda's conviction.""'
Despite Justice Douglas's forceful dissent, what I would call the
mischievous language (and others would call the encouraging
language) in Tucker did not go away. Indeed the language became
quite significant. In such cases as New York v. Quarles42°
(recognizing a "public safety" exception to the Miranda warnings)
and Oregon v. Elstad" (declining to apply the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine to a second confession),' the Court built
on the language in the Tucker opinion and reiterated Tucker's way
of looking at, and thinking about, Miranda.
Because of Tucker and its progeny, a successful defense of the
constitutionality of §3501 (the federal statutory provision
purporting to overrule Miranda), a defense that seemed almost
hopeless at the time the statute was enacted, began to look like a
distinct possibility. Then came Dickerson.
To the surprise of many, Chief Justice Rehnquist-who had
contributed mightily to the disparagement of Miranda-quickly
dismissed the way some opinions of the Court (including opinions
by Rehnquist himself!) seemed to have deconstitutionalized
Miranda1
119. Id at 462-63. A decade later, dissenting in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298, 370-71 (1985), which declined to apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine to a second confession obtained from a suspect whose Miranda rights
had not been honored the first time, Justice Stevens made a similar point.
120. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
121. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
122. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
123. After observing that "[rielying on the fact... that we have repeatedly
referred to the Miranda warning as 'prophylactic' and 'not themselves rights
protected by the Constitution,' the Court of Appeals [for the Fourth Circuit]
concluded that the protections announced in Miranda are not constitutionally
required," 120 S. Ct. at 2333, the Chief Justice continued, "[w]e disagree with the
Court of Appeals' conclusion, although we concede there is some language in
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The arguments for viewingMiranda as a constitutional decision,
the Chief Justice now concluded, were quite strong-almost
overwhelming: "[F]irst and foremost," Rehnquist told us, is that
"both Miranda and two of its companion cases applied the rule to
proceedings in state courts." 4 Moreover, since then we have
"consistently applied" the rule to the states12 and it is "beyond
dispute that we do not hold a supervisory power over the courts of
the several States.""2 (Of course, this is why Grano had argued that
Miranda, as the Court had characterized it in the 1970s and 80s, was
an illegitimate decision.)
What about the language in Miranda informing us that the
decision "in no way creates a constitutional straightjacket which
will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have
that effect"W-language that then-Justice Rehnquist had used to
downgrade and deconstitutionalize Miranda?...
The Chief Justice now told us, in a footnote, that "a review of
our opinion in Miranda"129 reveals that this language only means
that the Constitution does not require the specific safeguards set
forth in Miranda, or any other particular procedure, not that the
Constitution does not require some safeguard beyond the totality-
of-circumstances test "that is effective in securing Fifth Amendment
rights."
1 30
I think it is no exaggeration to say that the Chief Justice's
opinion in Dickerson, written a quarter-century after he wrote the
opinion of the Court in Tucker, reads almost as if he had recently
reread Justice Douglas's dissent in Tucker and, on further reflection,
decided that Douglas was right after all. 1 31




127. 384 U.S. at 467.
128. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444.
129. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2334 n.6.
130. Id
131. Not all Court watchers were as surprised as I was to see Chief Justice
Rehnquist voting to reaffirm Miranda. Professor Craig Bradley, a former
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Chief Justice Rehnquist did tell us that -Miranda, being a
constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled
by an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda
ourselves."' But, Rehnquist's opinion of the Court left much
unsaid.
The Court seemed to agree with Professor Cassell's contention
that "a legislative alternative to Miranda" that provided "an
adequate substitute for the warnings required byMiranda""' would
Rehnquist clerk and a close student of Rehnquist's work, did not find
Rehnquist's vote unexpected. He points out, inter alia, that in Dickerson
Rehnquist "show[ed] the kind of leadership [of the Court] that he has long
admired in previous chief justices." Craig Bradley Behind theDickerson Decision,
TRIAL, Oct. 2000, at 80. Rehnquist, adds Professor Bradley, had especially in
mind Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, who was "willing to modify his own
views to hold or increase his majority." Id. Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist
may have regardedDickerson as an occasion for the Court to maintain its power
against Congress, id.: "[Flor the Supreme Court to overrule Miranda itself is one
thing; to stand by while Congress does it is quite another. In Dickerson, the
majority... sent a strong Message to Congress: 'Stay off our Turf!'"
Another law professor who was not surprised by Chief Justice Rehnquist's
vote in Dickerson is Stephen Saltzburg. As I have noted elsewhere, see Yale
Kamisar, Your-Sort-ofRight to Remain Silent, NAT'L L.J., July 17, 2000, p. A-18,
on April 19, 2000, the day of the oral arguments in Dickerson, Professor
Saltzburg predicted, in a conversation with me and other lawyers, that the Court
would vote 7-2 to reaffirm Miranda and that the Chief Justice would write the
majority opinion. As did Professor Bradley, Professor Saltzburg stressed that
Chief Justice Rehnquist had increasingly assumed a leadership role and did not
want to see three decades of Miranda jurisprudence (and more than fifty cases
interpreting Miranda) "go up in smoke." Moreover, added Saltzburg, the Chief
Justice can live with Miranda-and he is confident the police can do so as
well-now that the case has been downsized in various ways and riddled with
exceptions.
132. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2329.
133. Id at 2335. Actually, at different places, the Court seemed to formulate
the test for an adequate legislative alternative differently. At one point, it referred
to Professor Cassell's contention that §3501 "complies with the requirement that
a legislative alternative to Miranda be equally as effective in preventing coerced
confessions" (a relatively easy objective to satisfy). See id. However, at another
point, the Court spoke of "Miranda requir[ing] procedures that will warn a
suspect in custody of his right to remain silent and which will assure the suspect
that the exercise of that right will be honored" (a much harder task if one is
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pass constitutional muster. But, it shed no light on what particular
legislative alternative would constitute a suitable substitute for the
Miranda warnings.'34
Other than to note (and then to dismiss the fact) that, as the
court below took into account, "we have repeatedly referred to the
Miranda warnings as 'prophylactic,' 13 the Court had nothing to
say about the nature of "prophylactic" rules or the limits, if any, on
the Court's power to promulgate such rules. Relying heavily on the
writings of Professor Grano, Professors Wayne LaFave, Jerold
Israel, and Nancy King have made a valiant effort to distinguish
"per se" rules from "prophylactic" ones,136 noting that "the
prophylactic rule is designed to operate as a preventative measure"
and "its purpose is to safeguard against a potential constitutional
violation, rather than to identify what constitutes a constitutional
violation."137 However, the Dickerson Court looked back on
Miranda as a case that sought to minimize the possibility of
overlooking an involuntary confession and thus (under the LaFave-
Israel-King analysis at any rate) seemed to view the Miranda
warnings as per se rules rather than prophylactic ones.'
seeking an alternative to the now-familiar warnings). See id
134. For example, would asystem of videotaping (or at least audiotaping) the
entire interrogation session (and informing the suspect of that fact) be a suitable
substitute for the warnings? Or would such a system only permit a shortened
version of the warnings? Compare Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An
EmpiricalReassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387,486-97 (1996) with Kamisar, Can
(Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda?, supra note 100, at 911-13 and Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small
Social Costs, 90 Nw. U.L. REv. 500, 556-60 (1996). See also Charles D.
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 109, 166-67 (1998).
135. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333.
136. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, AND NANCY J. KING,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE S 2.9(d), 2.9(e) (2d ed. 1999).
137. Id at S 2.9(e) at 672-73.
138. In Miranda, the Dickerson Court told us, "[w]e concluded that the
coercion inherent in custodial interrogation blurs the line between voluntary and
involuntary statements, and thus heightens the risk that an individual will not
be 'accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment... not to be compelled
to incriminate himself.'" Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2331 (quoting Miranda v.
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What, if anything, did Dickerson's reaffirmation of Miranda and
its recognition of the case as a "constitutional decision" do about
the philosophical tension between the approach taken in the
Warren Court's famous confession cases andthe approach taken by
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts? As already touched upon,...
Professor Grano saw a strong, indeed an irreconcilable,
philosophical tension between cases like Escobedo and Miranda
(which seemed not at all concerned about the damage to law
enforcement wrought by ever-growing restrictions on police
interrogation) and post-Warren Court cases, such as Moran v.
Burbine, 4 which underscored the need for police questioning as an
essential tool for enforcing the criminal laws.141 Grano deplored the
"doctrinal instability":
The commentators who defendMiranda are fully aware
that its holding shortchanged its philosophical premises, for
they invariably complain that the decision did not go far
enough in the restrictions it imposed on the police. Indeed,
even Miranda's critics concede that given its premises, logic
and intellectual honesty require the conclusion that valid
waivers are not possible in the custodial context.
If Miranda's holding was dishonest in terms of its
premises, the Court's more recent cases are even more so in
failing to repudiate that decision .... The current situation
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966)). Dickerson also observed that the Miranda
Court had "noted that reliance on the traditional totality-of-the-circumstances
test raised a risk of overlooking an involuntary custodial confession." hia at 2335.
139. See supra notes 53-62, 98-99 and accompanying text.
140. 475 U.S. 412 (1986). See also id. at 422-23, 426-27. In Burbine, a 6-3
majority held that aconfession preceded byan otherwise valid waiver of Miranda
rights should not be excluded either because the police misled an inquiring
attorney (whose services were requested by the suspect's sister) wheni they told
her they were not going to question the suspect she called about or because the
police failed to inform the suspect of the attorney's efforts to contact him. See id
141. See Grano, supra note 105, at 406-08.
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is doctrinally unstable, with two lines of irreconcilable cases
coexisting to give the Court a choice between allowing or
disallowing the police to have the necessary tools for
effective interrogation....
The precepts of principled jurisprudence require the
Court to resolve the irreconcilable tension betweenMiranda
and the more recent cases. Either the Court should take
Miranda seriously, which would mean both extending
Miranda's restrictions even further and rejecting the Court's
more recent cases, or it should repudiate the thinking that
demands such a result. If police interrogation is to survive,
the Court must do the latter. To repudiate Miranda's
underlying thinking honestly and persuasively, however,
the Court must overrule that decision, for devoid of its
philosophical assumptions, Miranda's holding is
incomprehensible.14
As we now know, the Court did not overrule Miranda. But I
very much doubt that the Court will extend Miranda's restrictions
any further or reject any of the post-Miranda decisions that have
down-sized that landmark case.143 In short, I do not believe
Dickerson will do anything to reduce the doctrinal instability that
so pervades this area and so agitates Professor Grano. Indeed, I fear
that future cases will demonstrate that Dickerson has only
aggravated the doctrinal instability in the confessions area (or
should one say, doctrinal incoherence).
Consider Oregon v. Elstad, which declined to apply the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine to a second confession obtained from
a suspect whose Miranda rights had not been honored the first
time.1" The case seems to be based on the premise that a failure to
administer the Miranda warnings is not a violation of a
142. Grano, supra note 1, at 218.
143. For a useful discussion of the various ways in which Miranda has been
riddled with qualifications and exceptions, see Alfredo Garcia, IsMiranda Dead
Was It Overruled, Oris It Irrelevant?, 10 ST. THoMAS L. REV. 461 (1998).
144. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 370-71.
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constitutional right (as would be a violation of the Fourth
Amendment or "police infringement of the Fifth Amendment
itself"14 ) and thus "should not breed the same irremediable
consequences " " as a violation of a constitutional right. In the wake
of Dickerson, defense lawyers will now argue that because the
premise of Elstad-Miranda is not a constitutional ruling-is no
longer operative, Elstad should be overruled. Will they succeed.)
To take another example, consider the so-called"impeachment"
cases, Harris v. New York147 and Oregon v. Hass,14 which held that
a defendant who takes the stand in his own defense can be
impeached by statements taken from him in violation of Miranda.
These cases seemed to be based on a distinction between statements
merely obtained in violation of Miranda and statements obtained in
violation of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process or the Self-
Incrimination Clause. 49 Now that Dickerson is on the books,
145. Id. at 309: "If errors are made by law enforcement officers in
administering the prophylactic Miranda procedures, they should not breed the
same irremediable consequences as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment
itself." The Court continued:
Respondent's contention that his confession... must be excluded as
"fruit of the poisonous tree" assumes the existence of a constitutional
violation...
But a procedural Miranda violation differs in significant respects from
violations of the Fourth Amendment, which have traditionally
mandated a broad application of the "fruits" doctrine....
As in (the instant case], the breach of the Miranda procedures in Tucker
involved no actual compulsion. . . Since there was no actual
infringement of the suspect's constitutional rights, the case was not
controlled by the doctrine... that fruits of a constitutional violation
must be suppressed.
Tat at 305-08.
146. Id. at 309.
147.401 U.S. 222 (1971).
148.420 U.S. 714 (1975).
149. See Hass, 420 U.S. at 722. The Court subsequently made it clear that
neither testimony given by a person in response to a grant of legislative
inmunity, nor statements that were "involuntary" or "coerced," could be used
for impeachment purposes. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979);
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
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defense lawyers will argue that statements obtained in violation of
Miranda can no longer be regarded as any less unconstitutional than
statements that infringe traditional "voluntariness" standards. But
again, will they succeed?
I venture to say that in the years ahead, defense lawyers are
likely to discover that the Chief Justice wrote an opinion
reaffirming Miranda as it has been shaped in the past three decades.
(Although he comes at it from a different direction, I think Grano
would join me in referring to Miranda as it has been misshaped in
the past three decades.) What has been reaffirmed, at least as far as
the Chief Justice is concerned, and probably a majority of the
Court as well, is not Miranda as it first arrived on the scene in 1966,
but Miranda with all its exceptions attached-or, as Villanova Law
School's Laurie Magid described it in a recent conversation with
me, Miranda with all its exceptions "frozen in time."
If I am right, defense lawyers trying to restore Miranda to its
original vigor will discover that although the premises on which a
number of Miranda-debilitating cases are based seemed to have been
repudiated, the exceptions to Miranda are going to remain in place.
They are also likely to discover that language in Dickerson that may
not have seemed significant at the time the opinion was handed
down will take on considerable importance in future cases.
I am afraid that lawyers trying to reinvigorate Miranda in light
of Dickerson will be reminded that, what Chief Justice Rehnquist
calls "the sort of modifications represented by [the] cases
[interpreting Miranda narrowly]"q---what some, including me,
would call cases drawing distinctions between Miranda violations
and "real" constitutional violations,"5 ' cases that, as a matter of
150. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335. Consider the following:
These decisions [those carving out exceptions to Miranda] illustrate the
principle-not that Miranda is not a constitutional rule-but that no
constitutional rule is immutable. No court laying down a general rule
can possibly foresee the various circumstances in which counsel will
seek to apply it, and the sort of modifications represented by these cases
are as much a normal part of constitutional law as the original decision.
Id at 2335.
151. See Albert W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger
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logic, are no longer defensible after Dickerson-are, to quote the
Chief Justice's opinion in Dickerson again, "as much a normal part
of constitutional law as the original decision.l""
0
If Grano did not persuade a majority of the Dickerson Court,
his writings seemed to have had a considerable impact on Justice
Scalia, who, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote a long, forceful
dissent. As Grano had done, Justice Scalia denounced the Dickerson
majority for operating on the premise that the Court has the
power-what Justice Scalia called "an immense and frightening
antidemocratic power" that "does not exist""-"not merely to
apply the Constitution but to expand it, imposing what it regards
as useful 'prophylactic' restrictions upon Congress and the
States."" 4 Continued Scalia:
[In] my view, our continued application of the Miranda
Code to the States despite our consistent statements that
running afoul of its dictates does not necessarily-or even
usually--result in an actual constitutional violation,
represents not the source of Miranda's salvation, but rather
evidence of its ultimate illegitimacy. See generallyJ. Grano,
Confessions, Truth, and the Law, 173-198 (1993); Grano,
Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of
Article IllLegitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 100 (1985)."'
Justice Scalia made a number of points that were similar to
those made by Professor Grano in his various writings. Some
Court, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1436, 144243 (1987).
152. See supra note 150. It may well be that the significant number of
"exceptions" Miranda has had to bear is a principal reason why it is still alive
after three and a half decades.
153. 120 S. Ct. at 2337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2343.
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examples follow. Observed Scalia:
If [the majority's argument that Miranda must be a
constitutional decision immune to congressional
modification because it has been applied to the States since
its inception] is meant as an invocation of stare decisis, it fails
because though it is true that our cases applying Miranda
against the States must be reconsidered if Miranda is not
required by the Constitution, it is likewise true that our
[post-Miranda cases] based on the principle that Miranda is
not required by the Constitution will have to be
reconsidered if it is. So the stare decisis argument is a
wash.... 156
[W]hat is most remarkable about the Miranda decision-and
what made it unacceptable as a matter of straightforward
constitutional interpretation in the Marbury tradition-is its
palpable hostility toward the act of confessionper se, rather
than towards what the Constitution abhors, compelled
confession.... The Constitution is not, unlike the Miranda
majority, offended by a criminal's commendable qualm of
conscience or fortunate fit of stupidity... s7
156. Id. Cf Grano, supra note 1, at 205-06:
[B]y emphasizing inherent compulsion over potential compulsion as the
decision's rationale, the Court could conclude that all Miranda
violations are, after all, constitutional violations. As a preliminary
matter, this stratagem would not avoid problems relating to staredecisis,
for the Court has rejected this reading of Miranda on several occasions.
Indeed, the Court has based specific holdings on the premise that
Miranda is only prophylactic. If anything, the doctrine of stare decisis
counsels against an interpretation of Miranda that would require these
later cases to be overruled...
[T~he Court is "in a position where it must choose between two lines
of authority." Nothing in stare decisis suggests that the Court has an
obligation to favor the line of authority that is least defensible.
157. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2339-40. Cf. Grano, supra note 53 at 677, 679,
689:
[W]hy should we not rejoice that Escobedo's lack of intelligence,
rational judgment, or sophistication enabled the police to obtain reliable
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Neither am I persuaded by the argument for retaining
Miranda that touts its supposed workability as compared
with the totality-of-the-circumstances test it purported to
replace. Miranda's proponents cite ad nauseam the fact that
the Court was called upon to make difficult and subtle
distinctions in applying the "voluntariness" test in some 30-
odd due process "coerced confession" cases in the 30 years
. . . [preceding] Miranda. It is not immediately apparent,
however, that the judicial burden has been eased by the
"bright-line" rules adopted in Miranda. In fact, in the 34
years since Miranda was decided, this Court has been called
upon to decide nearly 60 cases involving a host of Miranda
issues, most of them predicted with remarkable prescience
by Justice White in his Miranda dissent .... 158
evidence to prove his guilt? Why would we prefer to increase the
likelihood that defendants like Escobedo will prevail over their
interrogators and thereby increase their chance of winning erroneous
acquittals at trial? ....
Confessions law will begin to make- sense only when we have the
courage to rebut [such arguments as the claim that police interrogation
tactics that play on the weakness of a suspect are morally offensive]
without hedge or apology. In the context of police interrogation, it
simply is not morally offensive to "take advantage of the psychological
vulnerabilities of a citizen....
Nothing in our Constitution or our morality precludes the police,
within limits, from trying to outsmart the suspect and to increase the
pressure on him to tell the truth. Indeed, our morality actually
approves such interrogation efforts.
See also the extracts from this Grano article that appear in the text at supra
notes 61-62. Consider, too, Gerald Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L.
REV. 1417, 1441-43, 1471-73 (1985).
158. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2346-47. Cf. Grano, supra note 1, at 207:
The argument that Miranda's rigidity has brought clarity to the law
may also be rebutted on its own terms. Much asJustice White predicted
in his Miranda dissent, Miranda has generated considerable litigation
concerning the meaning of custody and interrogation and the
requirements for a valid waiver. Even worse, Miranda's rigidity has
prompted courts to apply black-letter principles with little thought to
the underlying Fifth Amendment issue that is responsible for the entire
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But even were I to agree that the old totality-of-the-
circumstances test was more cumbersome [than Miranda],
it is simply not true that Miranda has banished it from the
law and replaced it with a new test. Under the current
regime, which the Court today retains in its entirety, courts
are frequently called upon to undertake both inquiries. That
is because . . . voluntariness remains the constitutional
standard, and as such continues to govern the admissibility
for impeachment purposes of statements taken in violation
of Miranda, the admissibility of the "fruits" of such
statements, and the admissibility of statements challenged as
unconstitutionally obtained despite the interrogator's
compliance with Miranda... .9
enterprise. The result has been a judicial formalism that cannot be a
source of pride to American jurisprudence.
In Dickerson, Chief Justice Rehnquist told us that "experience suggests that
the [pre-Miranda] totality-of-the circumstances test which § 3501 seeks to revive
is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement officers to conform to, and
for courts to apply in a consistent manner." Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336.
However, during the oral arguments in Dickerson, the Chief Justice seemed less
sanguine about the workability of Miranda. At one point, when counsel for Mr.
Dickerson stated that "the benefit of the Miranda rule is that it in most instances
provides clear-cut evidence for the court," the Chief responded: "Well, you say
it provides clear-cut evidence. I looked into the number of cases that we have had
construing Miranda, and there are about 50 of them, so that to say that it's easily
applied is a just myth." New York Times, April 20, 2000, p. A24.
159. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2347. Cf Grano, supra note 1, at 207:
[A]s previously discussed, Miranda has not, in any event, freed the
police and the courts from having to grapple with voluntariness issues.
Because of the Court's impeachment doctrine, for example, a defendant
who wants to preclude any use of his statement at trial can require the
court to rule on voluntariness issues. In addition, and perhaps more
significantly, the voluntariness doctrine still governs what the police
may do to encourage truth telling after a custodial suspect provides a
Mirand waiver.... [Thus,] police and courts must still struggle with
voluntariness issues. It may not be an exaggeration to say, therefore,
that Miranda merely added a rigid set of procedural requirements that
must be satisfied before the voluntariness test takes over.
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Professor Grano once said that "one need only attend academic
conferences on criminal procedure to discover how discrete and
insular 'conservatives' are in academia." " I think he exaggerated a
bit, but even if he were right, he went a long way toward making
up in talent, energy and, power what professors of his persuasion
lacked in numbers.
Conservative law professors need people like Joe Grano. But,
we liberal professors need people like him too. He challenges us.
He provokes us. He makes us (or at least should make us) rethink
our positions. And sometimes, no matter how strongly we felt
about an issue at first, the force of his reasoning made us change our
position, or at least revise it. This is how Joe educated us all.
160. Grano, supra note 105, at 399. "The same phenomenon exists," he
added, "in constitutional law, of which criminal procedure is really a part." Id
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